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Salt Lake County respectfully submits the following Answer to the Petition for
Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules on Appellate Procedure.
POINT I
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING SHOULD BE DENIED.
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the Petitioner to state
with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended. See Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co.. 43 P. 112 reh. den.,
45 P. 1097 (Utah 1896). Petitioner does not contend the Court overlooked the law or facts.
Rather, he contends the Court misapprehended the law. A misapprehension of the law is
evident when the "...decision is conflict with an express statute, or with a controlling decision
to which the Court's attention was not called, or where an higher appellate court has
decided the precise question adversely after the decision." Appeal and Error. 5 Am.Jur.2d.
§988 (footnotes omitted). None of the foregoing are involved in this matter.
"The purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new questions or rehash old arguments,
but to allow the Court to correct mistakes and consider misapprehensions." Kentnerv. Gulf
Insurance Company. 689 P.2d 955, 957 (Or. 1984); Lockhart v. Anderson. 646 P.2d 678, 681
(Utah 1982); Appeal and Error. 5 Am.Jur.2d. §988. But Shelledy merely elaborates on issues
fully briefed, argued and considered by the Court. Under these circumstances, the motion
should be denied. Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows. Co.. 192 A. 158 reh. den., 192 A. 464
(RI 1937); Pitek v. McGuire. 184 P.2d 647 (NM 1947).
POINT n
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION AS GRANTOR IS NOT DISPOSITIVE.

Respondent generally incorporates Point IH of its Brief, pp. 14-20, which addressed
the statute of limitations in the context of this proceeding.
The general rule is that the statute of limitations does not run against the United
States with respect to the disposition of the public domain or public lands. All of the cases
cited by the appellant in his Petition for Rehearing are in accord with this rule but all
involve public lands. "Public lands" means lands which are subject to "sale or other disposal
under general laws." Northern Lumber Company v. O'Brien. 204 U.S. 190 (1907).
The term does not include all land owned by the United States. "Land to which any
claims or rights of others have attached do not fall within this designation." Western Nuclear,
Inc. v. Andrus. 664 F.2d 234, 237 (10th Cir. 1981), citing Payne v. Central Pacific Railway
Company. 255 U.S. 228 (1921). The term public lands is "uniformly regarded as not
including lands to which rights have attached and became vested through full compliance
with applicable land law". Id., 65 L.Ed. 590, 602. It means "lands which are open to
settlement or other disposition under the laws of the United States, and does not encompass
lands in which rights of public have passed and which have become subject to the individual
rights of a seller." Hamerh v. Denton. 359 P.2d 121 (Alas. 1961).
Salt Lake County's tax liens had attached to the subject property prior to the SBA's
acquisition by quit claim deed dated January 14, 1981. The SBA acquired a title
encumbered by taxes theretofore lawfully assessed and levied, and subject to prior tax sales.
State v. Salt Lake County. 85 P.2d 851, 854 (1938). Thus, under the authority of Payne v.
Central Pacific Railway Company and Western Nuclear Inc.. v. Andrus. the subject property,
while encumbered by the County's tax liens prior to the SBA ownership, is not "public land"

2

or the "public domain". It was not subject to disposition under the general laws of the
United States. The fact a patent was not issued is prima facie evidence of this premise.
The cases cited by Petitioner apply only to "public lands" and are not on point.
The rule relied upon by Shelledy has its origin in the distribution of the public
domain in the 1800's by patent. Such policy, which was directed to prevent adverse
possession by trespassers, can be seen through the reasoning of the Court in Lindsev v.
Miller's Lessee. 6 Pet. [31 U.S.] 666 (1832).
"It is a well-settled principle, that the statute of
limitations does not run against a state. If a contrary rule were
sanctioned, it would only be necessary for intruders upon the
public lands to maintain their possessions, until the statute of
limitations shall run; and then they would become invested with
the title, against the government, and all persons claiming under
it. In this way, the public domain would soon be appropriated
by adventurers. Indeed, it would be utterly impracticable, by
the use of any power within the reach of the government, to
prevent this result. It is only necessary, therefore, to state the
case, in order to show the wisdom and propriety of the rule that
the statute never operates against the government."
Id., 6 Pet. [31 U.S.] at 672.
Even if the United States were to have instituted this action instead of Shelledy, if
it has no real interest in the case and the sole beneficiary of its action will be a private
person such as Shelledy, the defense of the statute of limitations is available, in the same
manner as in suits between private parties. United States v. Beebee. 127 U.S. 338 (1888);
Curtner v. United States. 149 U.S. 662 (1893).
In Beebee. the United States sued to set aside patents it had issued in favor of
Beebee. It contended the patents were obtained through fraud and were void. The Court
held that when the United States is not the real party in interest to the title or to land in
3

controversy and the benefit will accrue to a private party, the statute of limitations may be
asserted against the United States as if it were a contest between private litigants. The
Court held that the patents could not be set aside as void because the statute of limitations
barred the action.
In Curtner. the Court outlined the interest the government must have to avoid the
application of the statute of limitations.
f

The government must show that, like the private
individual, it has such an interest in the relief sought as entitles
it to move in the matter. ...[i]f it is apparent that the suit is
brought for the benefit of some third party, and that the United
States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy sought, and is
under no obligation to the party who will be benefited to
sustain an action for his use, - in short, if there does not appear
any obligation on the part of the United States to the public, or
to any individual, or any interest of its own, - it can no more
sustain such an action than any private person could under
similar circumstances."
M-, 149 U.S. at 988.
The underlying policy for applying the rule on the statute of limitations as urged by
Shelledy among private litigants does not exist in this case.
When the government has a direct pecuniary interest in
the subject matter of the litigation, as it has in questions
relating to the public domain, the defense of stale claim and
laches cannot be set up as a bar. But in cases where the
government, although a nominal plaintiff, has no real interest
in the litigation, having merely allowed its name to be used
therein for the sole benefit of a private person, the defenses of
laches and the statute of limitations are available, the same as
between private individuals. (Citations omitted).
Public Lands. 63A Am.Jur.2d. §130
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There is no underlying legal or policy reason why the statute of limitations
should not run in an action between private parties where the United States no longer has
an interest in the property or any legal obligation to defend the title it conveyed such as it
would have if it had conveyed the property by warranty deed.
POINT m
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
DEEDS WHICH ARE VOID AND VOIDABLE.
Respondent generally incorporates Point II of its Brief, pp. 10-14, wherein the
distinction as to the application of the statute of limitations to deeds void on their face and
deeds which are voidable is thoroughly briefed.
The cases cited by Petitioner are all distinguishable. In Bennion Insurance Company
v. 1st OK Corporation. 571 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1977), the statute of limitations was not an issue.
In Redfield v. Parks. 132 U.S. 239 (1889) the Court found the deed to be void on its face
because it was sold at tax sale on a different date than that recited on the face of the deed.
Thus, the general rule applies that the statute will not run in such an instance. Similarly,
Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation. 783 P.2d 1045 (Utah App. 1989) did not
address the affect of a statute of limitations on the validity of the deed issued at the tax sale.
POINT IV
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN ON
STANDING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE OF
UMITATIONS.
Respondent generally incorporates Point III of its Brief, pp. 14-20. The Petitioner
offered no evidence to the trial court on the issue of economic burden on the United States.
Petitioner now asserts without evidence in the record before the court that "there is no
5

doubt that this court's ruling restricts the SBA's ability to alienate its property interests".
This cannot now be raised on appeal.
The Court was correct in its determination that no substantia] relationship exists
between Shelledy and the SBA. The SBA did not warrant title. Had it done so, perhaps
the relationship asserted by Shelledy would exist. Secondly, the SBA could have intervened
in the proceedings below. It could not have been joined without its consent even though
it may have been an indispensable party. If it were an indispensable party and not subject
to joinder, the action would have been subject to dismissal under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Thirdly, there is no dilution of the United States rights by this holding. The United
States received valuable consideration for the property conveyed and thus has suffered no
economic burden. In the context of the statute of limitations defense, the United States is
not the real party in interest and the statute of limitations should run in litigation between
private parties.
POINT V
THE IMPLICATIONS ASSERTED BY PETITIONER ARE
NOT VALID.
Petitioner has asserted there are significant untenable implications to the Court's
decision. As to implications one and two, the cases relied upon by Petitioner relate to
public lands or the public domain and require a different analysis than property which is not
public land and which is no longer owned by the United States.
As to implication three, Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation is not impliedly
overruled since the statute of limitations was not an issue before the Court, and it is
6

factually distinguishable since the Court determined the property lay outside of the County's
geographic boundary.
As to implication number four, the petitioner has confused raising the constitutional
rights of another party before the statute of limitations has run and after it has run. The
Court's decision is limited only to the latter instance.
As to implication number five, the SBA may be a necessary party but can't be
ordered joined because of the sovereign immunity of the United States. Therefore, the
relief sought by Petitioner ordering the SBA be joined is inappropriate.

The SBA

transferred all its interest by quit claim deed. Shelledy was on notice when he received the
quit claim deed that there was a rival tax deed in existence and that the statute of
limitations had run. As such, Shelledy should have required $ warranty deedfromthe SBA
in order to protect his title.
CONCLUSION
The Petitioner has failed to show the Court misapprehended the law or overlooked
the law or facts. For that and the foregoing reasons, Salt Lake County requests the Court
deny the Petition for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted this /O

day of June, 199?.

MARY ELLEN SLOAN
Attorney for Salt Lake County
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